特朗普的“工厂拜物教”

Donald Trump and his economic team love manufacturing. That much is clear from Mr Trump’s speeches; from what his strategist Steve Bannon has said about his self-avowed economic nationalism; and from his trade adviser Peter Navarro’s attacks on Germany and stated goal to repatriate international supply chains.

唐纳德?特朗普(Donald Trump)和他的经济团队对制造业情有独钟。关于这一点，从特朗普的发言中、从其战略师史蒂夫?班农(Steve Bannon)围绕其自称的经济民族主义的说法中、以及从其贸易顾问彼得?纳瓦罗(Peter Navarro)对德国的攻击和其宣示的将国际供应链迁回国内的目标中，都能看得十分清楚。

There is a certain method in their factory worker machismo. As a matter of economic logic, a fetish for mercantilism — exports are good, imports are bad — goes hand in hand with one for manufacturing. The high productivity of manufacturing means a country with a large proportion of its workforce in factories needs to ship a lot of its output abroad: it will simply be producing too many goods for its own population to consume. Since it is harder to import services than goods, an industrial power will find it difficult to consume the full value of its excess production. Instead, it tends to become a financial creditor to the rest of the world, lending its customers the funds to buy its goods.

在他们这种对工厂工人的大男子情结中，存在着某种逻辑。出于经济上的逻辑，重商主义（那种认为出口是好事、进口是坏事的观念）的拜物教和制造业拜物教是成对出现的。制造业的高产意味着工厂工人占劳动力很大比例的国家需要输出许多产品：它生产的商品数量超出本国人口消费能力。由于进口服务比进口商品更难，一个工业大国会发现很难消费其过剩产出的全部价值。相反，该国往往会成为世界上其他国家的金融债权国，向客户出借资金，让对方买下该国的商品。

On a global level, there is only so much demand for manufacturers, and therefore only so many manufacturing jobs to be had. Only in a few countries, therefore, can manufacturing be the preponderant economic activity. For the past two generations, there are three countries that have traditionally been goods producers to the world: Germany, Japan and China. It is no coincidence that these have been both industrial powerhouses and surplus economies.

在全球层面，对制造业的需求只有这么多，所以制造业岗位也只能有这么多。因此，制造业只能在少数国家成为占优势的经济活动。过去两代人期间，只有三个国家成为传统意义上的世界工厂：德国、日本和中国。并非巧合的是，这三国既是工业强国，又是贸易顺差经济体。

The economic nationalism of President Trump and Messrs Navarro and Bannon can be described as Germany-envy. In those manufacturing powers, they see countries that have fought to hold on to the good, manly jobs that validate the status of the native working class. Like so often with machismo, the envy is rooted in insecurity — a feeling of inadequacy compared with the perceived strength sported by these economies. Since export surpluses cannot be enjoyed by all countries (unlike broader gains from trade), manufacturing fetishism leads logically to a zero-sum view of trade policy. It entails an attempt to displace the current surplus of manufacturing producers. Thus, in the context of a Germany-envying inferiority complex, the desire to repatriate global supply chains, limit imports and boost manufacturing makes sense.

特朗普总统以及纳瓦罗和班农的经济民族主义可以被描述为对德国的嫉妒。在他们看来，这些制造业强国努力保住了那些待遇不错的、男子气概的工作岗位，从而捍卫了本土工人阶级的地位。正如大男子情结所经常伴随的，这种嫉妒的根源在于不安全感——与那些经济体貌似具有的实力攀比所带来的不足感。由于不是所有国家都能享有出口顺差（这一点不同于通过贸易来扩大受益面），因此制造业拜物教合乎逻辑地得出对于贸易政策的零和看法。它涉及一种与制造业国家争夺经常账户顺差的企图。因此，在嫉妒德国的自卑情结的大背景下，把全球供应链迁回国内、限制进口和提振制造业的想法是可以自圆其说的。

But, outside the fetishists’ fantasies, it will not produce the desired effect. First, manufacturing machismo itself is a handicap when it comes to grasping the opportunities for a thriving economy. By far the largest number of jobs to be created in the US over the next decade will be in services, in particular the caring professions.

但是，在拜物者幻想的世界以外，它并不会产生想要的效果。首先，就抓住一个繁荣经济体的机遇而言，念念不忘制造业的大男子情结本身是一大障碍。今后10年，美国创造的服务业岗位数量（尤其是护理工作）将远超其他经济部门。

Factory fetishists might retort that it is this development they want to oppose by resurrecting factory employment. But this runs headlong into a second obstacle. Regardless of trade, automation is reducing the need for manufacturing jobs everywhere. As the economist Brad DeLong pointed out in a recent essay, that is true in Germany, too, which has seen a fall in factory employment almost as sharp as in the US (the same holds for Japan). Yes, manufacturing employment may be higher in Germany, and factory fetishists can regret that the US did not fight harder to hold on to dwindling manufacturing employment. But doing so would do nothing to stop the overall decline. No advanced economy, whether the US or Germany, will ever return to the high manufacturing employment shares of the mid-1970s or earlier. Besides, many German workers have faced long wage stagnation. And all the big industrial economies have chosen to internationalise their supply chains. Things are not as different from the US as the Trumpteam imagine.

工厂崇拜者们可能会反驳，他们想要复兴工厂就业，正是为了顶住这种发展趋势。但这样就会直接撞向第二个障碍。撇开贸易不谈，自动化正在减少各地的制造业岗位需求。正如经济学家布拉德?德朗(Brad DeLong)在最近的一篇论文中指出的，这一点也适用于德国，其工业就业的降幅几乎和美国一样剧烈（日本也是如此）。没错，德国的制造业就业比例或许高一些，而工厂崇拜者可以对这样一点表示遗憾：当初美国在保住不断减少的制造业就业方面不够努力。但即使努力了也无助于遏止制造业就业的整体下滑。无论是美国还是德国，没有哪个发达经济体会回到上世纪70年代中期或者更早时期的那种高比例的制造业就业。此外，很多德国工人已多年面临薪资停滞，同时所有大型工业经济体都选择将供应链国际化。这些经济体的情况不像特朗普团队所想的那样，与美国存在什么重大差异。

It gets worse. If the factory fetishists are obsessed enough to throw themselves into a battle for a steadily shrinking type of employment, they may well find that their most obvious weapons are doubled-edged at best. Suppose the Trump administration forced through changes in the North American Free Trade Agreement so as to repatriate all parts of the car production process, the most salient of the supply chains Mr Navarro says he wants to bring back. The result will be to make US-produced cars more expensive. How is that going to help expand American car exports?

还有更糟糕的问题。如果这些工厂崇拜者一意孤行，为了保护一类稳步萎缩的就业而不惜一战，他们很可能发现，自己手中最明显的武器往好了说也只是一把双刃剑。假设特朗普政府强行通过对《北美自由贸易协定》(NAFTA)的修改，从而把纳瓦罗希望迁回国内的供应链中最显著的汽车生产供应链迁回国内。结果将是使美国生产的汽车更昂贵。这怎么会帮助扩大美国汽车出口？

Or suppose that a border tax, or some other protectionist device, is put in place and successfully cuts imports. This would reduce the living standards of many Americans who would pay more for their consumer goods. But would it at least reduce the trade deficit or even create a surplus? No: the most likely effect would be to cut exports, too.

或者假设出台边境税，或者利用其他一些保护主义手段成功地削减进口。这将降低很多美国人的生活标准，因为他们需要为消费品花费更多的钱。不过，这能否至少降低贸易逆差，甚至创造贸易盈余？答案是否定的：最有可能的影响是出口也会减少。

Supporters of a border tax argue that the downward pressure on imports will temper the sale of dollars, causing an appreciation that will rebalance trade. Others cite the “backhaul problem”: shipowners adjust prices to discourage one-way shipments that leave vessels empty on half of their routes. If protectionism means they have fewer imports to bring in, they will charge more to take exports out.

边境税的支持者主张，进口所受的下行压力会限制美元的卖出，从而导致美元升值，推动贸易再平衡。其他人则引述“回程问题”：船东会调整价格，以抑制船舶在回程期间空载的单程运输。如果保护主义意味着船东运送到美国的进口减少，他们将抬高把美国的出口运往海外的运费。

Thus, protectionist policies are likely to shrink imports and exports, leaving the protected economy worse off than before and in no better position even by the misguided measures of the manufacturing fetishists themselves.

因此，保护主义政策很可能同时减少进口和出口，让受到保护的经济的状况比之前更糟，即使采用制造业崇拜者自己的具有误导性的衡量标准，也不会处于一个更好的境地。

Like all visions rooted in insecurity and envy, factory fetishism reflects a real problem. But pursuing it risks producing conflict, with little of the good effect the fetishists expect.

就像所有植根于不安全感和嫉妒的愿景一样，工厂拜物教反映了一个切实的问题。但是与这个问题“死磕”有可能制造冲突，而不会带来工厂崇拜者期待的良好效果。