沙特改革无法绕过教权

Mohammed bin SAlman, son of Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and his deputy crown prince, is commonly referred to as the power behind the throne. That phrase falls short after this week’s unveiling of his Vision 2030, the most ambitious reform programme in the kingdom’s history. Whether he succeeds or fails, for now he is the power.

沙特国王萨勒曼(King Salman)的儿子、副王储穆罕默德•本•萨勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)，通常被称为王权背后的掌权者。本周，在他公布沙特历史上最雄心勃勃的改革计划“愿景2030”(Vision 2030)之后，这个称呼已经不准确了。无论他是成是败，目前他就是掌权者。

Since his ageing father succeeded to the throne last year, the 30-year-old prince has taken hold of most of the main levers of power: as economy overlord, defence minister and architect of Saudi Arabia’s increasingly hawkish foreign policy. Now he has set breathtaking targets to wean Saudis off what he calls an “addiction to oil” by replacing fast depleting hydrocarbon revenue with income from private investment, privatisation and the creation of the world’s biggest sovereign wealth fund.

自从去年他年迈的父亲继承王位以来，这位30岁的王子已把持了国家的大部分主要权力：他是最高经济官员、国防部长，还是沙特日益鹰派的外交政策的设计者。如今，他制定了令人激动的目标，即用私人投资、私有化和打造全球最大主权财富基金产生的收益，取代快速减少的碳氢化合物收入，从而使沙特人摆脱他所称的“石油瘾”。

He plans to float up to 5 per cent of Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, and place it and other assets in this fund, which he envisages will eventually exceed $2tn and become a global investment force. He fore sees non-oil revenue quadrupling by 2020 from just over $40bn last year, before nearly doubling again by 2030. “I think in 2020 we can live without oil,” he said this weekCHKD.

他打算将国有石油公司沙特阿拉伯石油公司(Saudi Aramco)至多5%的股份公开发行，然后把筹得资金和其他资产注入主权财富基金中。他设想，该基金的规模最终将超过2万亿美元，成为全球投资领域的一支重要力量。他预计，到2020年非石油收入将在去年略高于400亿美元的基础上增加三倍，到2030年接近再翻一番。他本周表示：“我认为，2020年我们不靠石油收入也能生活。”

Prince Mohammed, known in diplomatic shorthand as MbS, has said he also intends to introduce accountability in a public administration plagued by waste and corruption — including at his defence ministry, responsible for the world’s third biggest arms procurement programme. He intends to raise locally sourced arms production from 2 per cent now to 50 per cent by 2030CHKD.

穆罕默德王子表示，他也打算在浪费和腐败问题严重的公共管理领域——包括他领导下的国防部——引入问责制。沙特国防部掌管着全球第三大武器采购项目。他打算到2030年把武器国产化率从目前的2%提升至50%。

All this rewrites the social contract whereby Saudis forgo political rights and offer fealty to the House of Saud in return for public sector jobs and cradle-to-grave welfare funded by oil. Coming even close to these goals implies radical social change, an upheaval in governance — all without much sign that the absolute monarchy intends its subjects to become fully participatory citizens.

所有这一切会重写当前的社会契约：沙特人放弃政治权利，效忠沙特王室(House of Saud)，以换取公共行业的工作机会以及依靠石油收入实现的从摇篮到坟墓的福利保障。即便只是朝这些目标靠近，都暗示着激进的社会改革、治理的巨变——同时并没有多少迹象表明这个绝对君主制国家打算让自己的臣民变成完全参与型公民。

While no one can fault MbS for his boldness, his programme resembles a mobilisation of technocrats to bypass big political obstacles. The biggest of these is the cornerstone of the state: the historic compact between the House of Saud and the House of ibn Abdul Wahhab, the 18th century preacher behind the most extreme version of Sunni Muslim orthodoxy ever attempted as a form of governance. The ruling family has until now relied on the Wahhabi establishment — as reactionary and bigoted as ever — for its legitimacy, in exchange for clerical control over areas such as education and the judiciary, as well as the segregation of women.

尽管谁也不能指责穆罕默德王子的大胆，但他的改革计划好像是想利用技术官僚绕过一些重大政治障碍。其中最大的政治障碍是沙特国家的基石：沙特王室(House of Saud)与伊本•阿卜杜勒•瓦哈卜家族(House of ibn Abdul Wahhab)缔结的历史性条约。伊本•阿卜杜勒•瓦哈卜是瓦哈比教派的创始人，生活在18世纪。该教派是伊斯兰教正统逊尼派各分支中，曾被尝试作为一种治理形式的最极端的一支。直到如今，沙特执政家族一直依赖瓦哈比当权派——他们像以往任何时候一样极端顽固保守——维持执政合法性，同时作为回报，给予后者在教育、司法以及隔离女性等领域的宗教控制权。

That is one lever of power the deputy crown prince does not hold, and it is hard to see his reform plans prospering if this symbiotic compact stays as it is. Deference to Saudi Arabia, moreover, has diminished as understanding grows of the ways in which Wahhabi proselytism feeds into virulent jihadi phenomena such as al-Qaeda and Isis. That alone undermines the kingdom’s potential as an investment magnet.

这是这位副王储并未掌握的一种权力，倘若这一共存条约不改变的话，我们是很难看到他的改革计划取得成功的。此外，随着人们日益了解瓦哈比教派的劝诱改宗如何催生基地组织(al-Qaeda)、伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(ISIS)等危险圣战组织，外界对沙特的尊重减弱了。仅这一点就损害了沙特的潜在投资吸引力。

MbS, with a reputation for strong-headedness, may be seeking new sources of legitimacy from his own generation. He still has to consolidate his power inside a sprawling, faction-ridden family — but he has given a few hints.

以固执而著称的穆罕默德王子，或许正向他的同代人那里寻找新的执政合法性来源。他还是得在一个派系林立的庞大家族内巩固自己的权力——但他也给出了些许暗示。

This month the unbridled power of the religious police, the notorious Mutawa, was curbed; the force can no longer arrest, question or pursue those judged in breach of its stern social mores. This week he said that whether Saudi women — whose participation in the workforce he intends to increase — would win the right to drive was a decision for society. Yet in a recent interview with Bloomberg he said: “We believe women have rights in Islam that they’ve yet to obtain” — almost an invitation for Saudis to become more assertive on this and similarly discriminatory issues.

本月，沙特臭名昭著的宗教警察(Mutawa)肆无忌惮的权力受到了限制；他们再也不能逮捕、审问或追捕那些被认定违反了其严厉社会风俗的人。本周，他表示，沙特妇女——他打算让更多妇女进入职场——是否将赢得驾驶权利，是社会的决定。但他不久前接受彭博社(Bloomberg)采访时表示，“我们相信，在伊斯兰世界中，妇女还有权利尚未实现”——这几乎是鼓励沙特人在这个问题以及其他具有同样歧视性的问题上表现得更坚决。

But on education, for example, reform cannot sidestep the clergy. At the heart of the MbS plan is the creation of private-sector jobs for underemployed, often underqualified youth, much of whose schooling consists of bombardment with Wahhabi dogma. One front-rank Gulf employer tells of interviewing a Saudi graduate whose doctorate was on Islamic ablutions.

但是，改革在比如教育等领域无法绕过教权。穆罕默德王子改革方案的核心，是为那些未充分就业、往往资质不足的年轻人创造私人部门的工作机会。在这些年轻人中，很多人受到的教育都包括大量瓦哈比教义的灌输。一家海湾地区的一流雇主谈到，他们曾经面试过一名沙特毕业生，这名毕业生博士读的是伊斯兰净礼。

Prince Mohammed’s vision calls for wholesale curriculum reform and five Saudi universities in the top 200. There are no technocratic bypasses on that road, which leads to collision with the Wahhabi clerical establishment.

穆罕默德王子的愿景呼吁实施全面的课程改革，让5所沙特大学进入全球前200名。这个目标是无法通过技术官僚式绕路实现的，这意味着与瓦哈比宗教当权派的冲突在所难免。