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当前民粹主义浪潮不同于上世纪30年代

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当前民粹主义浪潮不同于上世纪30年代

The wave of populism in the western world which has given us Brexit, and may carry Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen to power in the US and France respectively, has been compared to the social forces which drove the politics of the 1930s. Increasing job insecurity or unemployment in Europe and the failure of median wages to rise for many years in the US are cited as the “root causes” of the phenomenon.

西方世界这波民粹主义浪潮造成了英国退欧,还可能会把唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和马琳•勒庞(Marine Le Pen)分别推上美国和法国的权力巅峰。此次浪潮被比作上世纪30年代推动政治变化的社会力量。欧洲国家就业环境日益不稳定或失业状况加剧、美国多年来薪资中值停止增长,被称为此种现象的“根源”。

This is a “social-democratic” explanation of the current western political crisis. The suggested remedies that flow from it are also predictably social-democratic: reducing job insecurity and inequality, increasing social benefits, especially for those in work, and raising taxes. If you have no choice, reduce immigration before the populists do it for you.

这是从“社会民主主义”角度对当前西方政治危机做出的解释。相应的补救建议自然也从社会民主主义角度出发:改善就业不稳定状况和减轻不平等程度,增加社会福利、特别是针对劳动群体的福利,增加税收。如果你别无选择,那么赶在民粹派之前减少移民涌入。

However, the parallel drawn with the politics of the 1930s is overblown. Fascism in Germany and Austria and revolutionary leftism in Spain thrived as a result of truly extreme economic deprivation. Gross domestic product in Germany fell by 30 per cent after the Great Crash in 1929, and unemployment reached 6m. In Spain the Civil war was preceded by widespread hunger in the south and artillery shelling of striking miners in the north.

然而,将此次民粹主义浪潮与上世纪30年代的政治状况相提并论,未免过于夸张了。当时德国和奥地利的法西斯主义、西班牙的革命左倾思潮盛行,是经济极度凋敝的结果。在1929年大崩溃(Great Crash)后,德国国内生产总值(GDP)下滑30%,失业人口达600万。在西班牙,南方遭遇大规模饥荒、北方罢工的矿工遭到炮火轰炸,内战随后爆发。

Today, by contrast, the economic performance of Poland and Britain, the two countries that have already succumbed to the present populist wave, is well above the average in Europe. Poland has been the EU star performer, with GDP growth of 28 per cent between 2007 and 2015. Contrary to the “social democratic narrative”, inequality in Poland has fallen. The real income of the middle 60 per cent of households has increased by more than 30 per cent and unemployment is at an all-time low of 6.3 per cent on the harmonised EU definition.

而在今天,波兰和英国——这两国已经屈服于当前民粹主义浪潮——经济表现却远好于欧洲平均水平。波兰是欧盟的经济之星,2007年至2015年期间GDP增长了28%。与“社会民主主义的论述”相反,波兰的不平等程度有所减轻。处于中间60%的波兰家庭的实际收入增长了30%以上,失业率按照欧盟协调定义计算处于6.3%的空前低点。

The UK has also done quite well, with German-style GDP growth and unemployment at 5 per cent, whereas the next country in line for a populist insurgency may be the US, which has performed far better since the crisis than Europe.

英国的经济表现也相当好,它拥有德国式的GDP增长,同时失业率仅为5%。下一个即将迎来民粹主义动荡的国家可能是美国,自金融危机以来,美国的经济表现远超欧洲。

At the other end of the scale, the countries that have suffered most are not necessarily electing populists. Three days after the Brexit vote in the UK, Spanish voters increased support for Mariano Rajoy’s centre-right Popular party, in spite of a series of corruption scandals linked to it. In an even greater surprise, they gave the leadership of the left to the moderate, social-democratic Socialist party in preference to the far-left Unidos Podemos movement.

在天平的另一端,经济状况最糟糕的国家并不一定都会选举民粹派。在英国举行退欧公投3天后,西班牙选民对马里亚诺•拉霍伊(Mariano Rajoy)领导的中右翼人民党(Popular party)的支持率有所提高,尽管该政党曝出了一系列腐败丑闻。更令人惊讶的是,他们把左翼的领导权交给了温和的、奉行社会民主主义的社会党(socialist party),而没有选择极左翼的“我们可以”联盟(Unidos Podemos)。

Yet, contrary to Britain, Spain has seen its GDP fall by a cumulative 8 per cent since 2007 and is hampered by unemployment exceeding 20 per cent (50 per cent among the young). Italy, with a similarly poor record of economic achievement has also, so far, resisted the temptation of Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement, opting instead for the moderate left-of-centre government of Matteo Renzi. Greece is, of course, the exception that proves the rule. The 25 per cent decline in GDP it has suffered is truly on the scale of the 1930s, so maybe we should not be surprised that it elected the neo-Marxist Syriza.

与英国相反,自2007年以来西班牙的GDP累计下滑8%,同时失业率超过20%(年轻人群体的失业率为50%)。经济表现同样糟糕的意大利,目前为止也抵挡住了贝佩•格里洛(Beppe Grillo)领导的五星运动党(Five Star Movement)的诱惑,反而选择支持温和的中间偏左的马泰奥•伦齐(Matteo Renzi)政府。当然,希腊是个例外。其GDP下滑25%,与上世纪30年代时的情况相当,因此或许我们不应该对奉行新马克思主义的激进左翼联盟(Syriza)当选感到惊讶。

So what is happening, if the present populism is not correlated with unbearable misery, as it was in 1930s Europe? The alternative to the social-democratic explanation is a conservative one: populists are doing well in countries that are doing well, because voters there do not believe that anything really bad can truly happen. Why not “give the populists a chance” to fulfil their promises? After all, maybe they can deliver.

如果说目前民粹主义的盛行和难以承受的苦难(就像上世纪30年代的欧洲所经历的那样)无关,那么现在到底怎么了?除了社会民主主义的解释,还有一种方法是从保守主义的角度来解释:在经济表现较好的国家,民粹主义者也较受欢迎,因为选民不认为真的会有糟糕的情况发生。何不“给民粹派一个机会”,让他们去兑现他们的承诺?没准他们能做到呢。

Indeed, the leaders of the Brexit campaign have been decidedly Pollyanna-ish in their confidence that Britain will thrive, trading with the world once it throws off the shackles of Brussels. The Law and Justice party in Poland has beaten the same drum: its main slogan is a straight translation from Barack Obama’s sunny “Yes we can” (“Damy Radę”). Hardly the stuff Mein Kampf is made of.

英国退欧阵营的领导人在英国未来发展的问题上无疑是盲目乐观的,他们认为一旦抛开了布鲁塞尔的枷锁,英国将与世界建立贸易往来,实现繁荣发展。波兰法律与公正党(Law and Justice party)也鼓吹着相同的口号:它的主要口号就是直接从巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)那句阳光向上的“是的,我们可以”(Yes we can)翻译过来的(“Damy Radę”)。不太像《我的奋斗》(Mein Kampf,希特勒所著)中的内容。

On the other hand, voters in countries that have suffered most from the crisis know that bad things can indeed happen. As a result, they have — so far — behaved more responsibly. Even the Greeks re-elected Syriza after it pragmatically chose austerity and reform instead of Grexit.

另一方面,那些受危机影响最严重的国家的选民知道,糟糕的事情确实可能发生。因此,他们的行为——迄今为止——更加负责。即使是希腊人也再次选择了激进左翼联盟,尽管该党务实地选择紧缩和改革、而没选择退欧。

Unfortunately this conservative explanation is not much more hopeful than the social-democratic one in its implications for the future. We may not be reliving the dark 1930s. But the wishful thinking and irresponsibility of those in comparatively well-performing countries bears a uncanny resemblance to the way the nations of Europe, in the sunny early August of 1914 went off singing to war, convinced that “it will all be over by Christmas”.

遗憾的是,这种保守主义的解释并不比社会民主主义的解释让人对未来更加怀抱希望。现在或许不是上世纪30年代的翻版。但是,那些经济表现相对较好的国家的某些人一厢情愿的想法和不负责任的行为,与在1914年阳光明媚的8月初唱着歌出征、坚信“战争将在圣诞前结束”的某些欧洲国家有着惊人的相似。