奥巴马主义导致危险的不作为

Dwight D Eisenhower left the White House in 1961 cautioning against the designs of the military-industrial complex assembled to confront the Soviet Union. Barack Obama sees a real and present danger in a Washington foreign policy establishment inclined to set military intervention as the default option.

德怀特•D•艾森豪威尔(Dwight D Eisenhower) 1961年离开白宫时，曾告诫美国人要警惕为对抗苏联而打造的军工复合体设计。巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)认为，华盛顿的外交政策体制内人士构成真实且迫在眉睫的危险，这些人倾向于把军事干预当作默认选项。

Mr Obama likes to recall Eisenhower’s view of war as mankind’s “most tragic and stupid folly”. He has resolutely resisted what his Republican predecessor once called a “recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties”.

奥巴马喜欢援引艾森豪威尔的战争观，即战争是人类“最可悲最愚蠢的胡闹”。他坚决抵制他的共和党前任所称的一种“反复出现的诱惑——认为某些壮观的、代价高昂的行动可能成为当前所有困难的奇迹般解决方案”。

America got what it voted for in 2008. Mr Obama won because he was not George W Bush. As a state senator in Illinois he had opposed the invasion of Iraq and campaigned to bring the troops home from the Middle East. The aversion to war, the frustration with Arab allies, the diplomatic outreach to Iran, irritation with “freeriding” Europeans and a reluctance to take on Russia’s Vladimir Putin over Ukraine, all fit the temperament of a leader intent on avoiding “stupid shit”. The surprise is that so many were surprised by his refusal to be drawn into a fight with Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

2008年，美国在选举中如愿以偿，把奥巴马选入白宫。奥巴马获胜的原因在于他不是乔治•W•布什(George W Bush)。在担任伊利诺伊州参议员时，奥巴马就反对出兵伊拉克，并在竞选中承诺从中东撤军。厌恶战争、对阿拉伯盟友的失望、与伊朗进行外交接触、对欧洲国家“搭便车”表示不满，以及不愿在乌克兰问题上与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)摊牌，所有这些都符合一位决心避免“做蠢事”的领导人的性情。意外的是，竟有如此多的人对他拒绝被卷入与叙利亚巴沙尔•阿萨德(Bashar al-Aassad)政权开战感到惊讶。

All this is charted by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic after a series of interviews with the president. What stands out from Mr Goldberg’s elegant essay is Mr Obama’s unshakeable conviction that he is on the right side of history. There is not the smallest smidgen of self-doubt. Others (including White House aides) saw the failure to enforce a “red line” on Mr Assad’s use of chemical weapons as a big blow to US power and prestige. The president says simply: “I’m very proud of this moment”.

在对奥巴马进行了一系列访谈后，杰弗里•戈德堡(Jeffrey Goldberg)把这一切都勾勒在了《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic)的一篇文章中。从戈德堡这篇精彩文章中脱颖而出的是奥巴马毫不动摇的信念——他站在历史正确的一边。他没有丝毫一点点自我怀疑。其他人（包括白宫的一些助理）则认为，未能对阿萨德使用化学武器执行“红线”是对美国实力和威望的重大打击。奥巴马只是简单地说：“我对这一刻感到非常自豪”。

Even leaders so obviously untroubled by self-doubt fret about their legacy. Watching Syria burn cannot be comfortable. Mr Obama wants to be remembered instead for the remarkable diplomatic deal that has checked Iran’s nuclear programme, for the opening to Cuba, for a pivot to Asia and for last December’s global deal on climate change.

即便是那些显然不为自我怀疑所累的领导人，也会为自己将留下什么样的政治遗产而操心。眼睁睁地看着叙利亚战火纷飞不可能让人舒服。相反，奥巴马希望世人记住他推动的阻止伊朗核计划的重大外交协议、与古巴关系和解、重返亚洲以及去年12月达成的全球气候变化协议。

The starting point is a visceral scorn for what Mr Obama calls a “Washington playbook” that measures US power in terms of the willingness to deploy force. When the US steps back, the story runs, its credibility is shredded. In Mr Obama’s mind such logic leads inexorably to military intervention. Credibility, as Mr Goldberg writes, becomes “dropping bombs on someone to prove you are willing to drop bombs on someone”.

起点是对奥巴马所称的“华盛顿剧本”——用部署军队的意愿来衡量美国的实力——的本能轻蔑。按照这种逻辑，只要美国后退一步，其可信度就会荡然无存。在奥巴马看来，这必然会导致军事干预。戈德堡写道，可信度将变成“为了证明你愿意扔炸弹而向某人扔炸弹”。

In truth, Mr Obama’s critics have argued for something less than a rush to war in Syria — for safe zones and more help for the rebels rather than tens of thousands of boots on the ground. The costs of international inaction have been counted in hundreds of thousands killed and millions driven from their homes. And yes, there has been a visible effect on America’s international standing. Mr Obama’s answer to this catastrophe: “There are going to be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed but there are going to be times when we can’t.”

实际上，奥巴马的批评者当初并未主张全力投入叙利亚战争；他们建议设立安全区，向叛军提供更多援助，而非派遣数万地面部队。国际社会不作为的代价是数十万人死亡，数百万人被迫逃离家园。当然，这对美国的国际声誉造成了明显影响。奥巴马对这一灾难性结果的回答是：“有时我们能够采取行动帮助无辜的人免遭杀戮，但有时我们无能为力。”

The president has a point. The US retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan was proof enough of the limits of military power. Losing wars has done more damage to American credibility than choosing not to fight them. It is hard enough even for a superpower to maintain order between states; it is all but impossible to impose it within fractured states.

美国总统的话有一定道理。美国从伊拉克和阿富汗撤军就足以证明军事力量的局限性。输掉战争对美国可信度的损害比选择逃避战争更大。对于一个超级大国而言，维持国家间的秩序已经够难了；在分裂的国家内部维持秩序就更不可能了。

The Washington mindset has not caught up with the think-tank reports charting the rise of China and global power shifts of the past decade. There is a reluctance to admit the passing of the unipolar moment and a just-do-something reflex that tends to reach first for a military option. I am with those who believe the US should have done more to support the uprising against Mr Assad’s regime. I am less confident the outcome would have been measurably different.

华盛顿的思维模式还未跟上各种智库报告，后者描绘了过去10年间中国的崛起以及全球实力的转移。体制内人士不愿承认单极世界的时刻已经过去，而做点什么的本能反应往往会首先考虑军事选项。我支持一些人的想法，他们认为美国本应做更多来支持反对阿萨德政权的起义。但我并不认为这样做的结局会有明显不同。

For all that, Mr Obama’s deracinated calculation misses the human dynamic in international relations. There is no algorithm to mimic the personal judgments that leaders invariably make of their allies and adversaries. Perceptions count for as much as reality. It really does matter if an adversary concludes that hesitation here will be replicated by weakness there. Beijing notices when Mr Putin gets away with it. Successful diplomacy demands leverage; semaphoring an aversion to military entanglement depletes that leverage.

尽管如此，奥巴马精明的算计还是忽视了国际关系中的人性动因。没有任何算法可以模拟领导人对其盟友和对手做出的个人判断。感性认识与现实同等重要。如果让对手得出结论：你在这件事上的犹豫将重现于另一件事上的软弱，那将确实事关重大。当普京能够为所欲为时，北京方面注意到了。成功的外交需要杠杆；公开宣布厌恶军事干预只会自毁杠杆。

The president is content to call himself a foreign policy realist — though he insists the hard-headed assessment of core national interests that keeps him out of the Middle East is leavened by the internationalism that has seen him at the centre of the climate change talks.

奥巴马满足于称自己为一个外交政策现实主义者，尽管他坚称，他既有让他置身中东事外的对国家核心利益的现实评估，也受到推动他置身于气候变化谈判中心的国际主义的影响。

What is missing from the Obama doctrine is a strategic view of the role of US leadership in sustaining global order. Analysis drifts into an excuse for paralysis, but inaction carries as many dangers as intervention. Mr Obama’s realism bleeds into fatalism. To observe that the US cannot solve every problem in a disordered world should not be to conclude it is powerless. Disorder is contagious and does not respect neat lines drawn around core national interests.

“奥巴马主义”缺失的是从战略角度看待美国在维持全球秩序方面的领导角色。分析渐渐沦为瘫痪的借口，但不作为的危险与出手干预同样多。奥巴马的现实主义已经沦为宿命论。有关美国无法在一个无序的世界解决所有问题的观察心得，不能作为美国无能为力这一结论的依据。失序会传染，而且不会尊重围绕国家核心利益划出的清晰界线。

As for Eisenhower, cautious he might have been about the rise of the military industrial complex, but he was not a non-interventionist. To the contrary, he was drafted to keep the Republican nomination out of the hands of Robert A Taft — the isolationist who had argued that US core interests did not extend to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

至于艾森豪威尔，他或许对军事工业复合体的崛起抱有戒心，但他并非一名不干涉主义者。相反，他当初参选就是为了不让罗伯特•A•塔夫脱(Robert A Taft)赢得共和党总统候选人提名，后者是一名孤立主义者，曾表示美国的核心利益不包括打败纳粹德国。