货币联盟是否公平? 苏格兰要英镑等于没独立

Is the opposition of the three main politicAl parties at Westminster to a post-independence currency union with Scotland a bluff? North of the border, many believe it is. I have no window into men’s souls: these Scots may be right.

英国国会三大主要政党声称，假如苏格兰独立，将反对与其缔结货币同盟。他们是在虚张声势吗？在苏格兰，许多人认为是这样。我没有看穿他人心思的本事：这些苏格兰人或许是对的。

But I hope it is no bluff. A currency union does not have to be ruled out on any terms. But a union that could make sense for the rest of the UK would be highly unequal. Why would a newly independent nation accept it?

但我希望这不是虚张声势。无论如何，都不一定非得排除货币联盟这种选择。但是，一个对英国其余地区来说可能算是合理选择的联盟，对苏格兰来说将是极不平等的。为何一个新独立的国家要接受这样的联盟？

Experience with the euro has clarified many issues relating to currency unions. Some are only partially relevant to a currency union between Scotland and the rest of the UK. While the oil-dependent Scottish economy would be different from that of the rest of the UK, it is fair to argue that, after more than three centuries, integration of the economies and, in particular, the labour markets, is sufficient to make currency union workable. This, after all, is an old and successful venture.

欧元的经验阐明了许多与货币联盟有关的问题。有些问题只跟苏格兰与英国其余地区之间的货币联盟存在部分关系。尽管依赖石油的苏格兰经济会不同于英国其余地区，但我们有理由认为，经过了三个多世纪，两种经济之间的融合，特别是劳动力市场的融合，足以保证货币联盟是可行的。毕竟，这是项古老而成功的尝试。

That is part of the reason why it is hard to understand the zeal for independence. Is it, as Oxford’s Paul Collier has argued, really no more elevated than a resource grab?

我们之所以难以理解苏格兰人为何对独立有那么大劲头，部分原因就在于此。是否如牛津大学(Oxford)的保罗•柯利尔(Paul Collier)所辩称的，苏格兰要求独立，表面上有冠冕堂皇的理由，实质上不过是为了抢夺资源？

Accept that the currency union could work from a narrowly economic point of view. Is that the end of the story? Definitely not. The point about a currency union – evident from the experience of the eurozone – is that it is not just about the economies. Sharing a fiat (or government-made) money entails a high degree of institutional and political integration. This is why currency unions between notionally independent states are so fraught.

假定仅从经济角度来看，这个货币联盟是可行的。这样就可以了吗？当然不。从欧元区的经验可以明显看出，货币联盟的意义在于，它关乎的不仅仅是经济。共享法定（即政府定的）货币，必然会导致高度的制度和政治一体化。正因如此，名义上独立的国家之间的货币联盟才这么令人头疼。

Risking that might have made sense for countries proposing to move towards a deeper union, as was the case for the euro (however ill-advised). But how can it make sense for a country that has decided to dissolve a union? It is weird to tell the English you are desperate to be rid of them and, in the same breath, say you trust them so much that you wish to share a core activity of the state you are leaving.

如果相关国家提议进一步深化联盟关系——欧元区就是这种情况（不管这种提议有多么不明智）——那么冒这种风险或许还说得通。但一个已决定要拆散联盟的国家，还有何道理冒这样的风险？一边对英格兰人说你迫切想要摆脱他们，一边又说你是如此信任他们、以至于希望共享这个你将要脱离的国家的一项核心活动，这太奇怪了。

How then should the rest of the UK respond the day after a “yes” vote, should that sad event occur? By saying that Scotland can be in the sterling area, provided the institutions of that union are established under the law of the rest of the UK and are accountable to its government. Among other things, these institutions would carry out financial regulation. The fiscal policy of Scotland would be controlled by binding agreements. Scotland would also have specified fiscal obligations in the event of a bailout. These arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the UK would be established by treaty.

那么，在支持独立的阵营在公投中胜出（假设真的发生这种令人遗憾的情况）后，英国其余地区该如何应对？答案是告诉苏格兰说它可以留在英镑区内，条件是该货币联盟的机构必须依照英国其余地区的法律成立、并向英国政府负责。这些机构的职责之一是实施金融监管。苏格兰的财政政策将受到有约束力的协议的控制。在发生纾困的情况下，苏格兰还将承担明确规定的财政义务。苏格兰和英国其余地区之间的这些安排将通过条约来设立。

The logic of the one-sided fiscal rules is that within a currency union, the cost of fiscal profligacy by a smaller member may be shifted on to the larger one. But the much larger member cannot shift the cost of its profligacy on to the smaller one. Thus Scotland would have an incentive towards profligacy that the rest of the UK would not. A one-sided risk demands one-sided control.

这种“一边倒”的财政规则的道理是，在货币联盟之内，较小成员财政挥霍的成本，或许会转嫁给较大成员；而规模大得多的那个成员，却无法将其财政挥霍的成本转嫁给较小成员。因此，苏格兰有动机趋向挥霍，英国其余地区则没有。“一边倒”的风险要求“一边倒”的控制。

A similar logic applies to financial regulation. Scotland might gain from a financial boom headquartered in Edinburgh whose costs ultimately fell on the rest of the UK. For this reason, regulation would need to be centralised. But Scotland would have to take on some fiscal obligations in the event of a disaster. They could not fall solely on the rest of the UK.

类似的道理也适用于金融监管。苏格兰或许会从总部位于爱丁堡的金融机构掀起的金融热潮中获益，但其成本最终会落在英国其余地区头上。因此，监管必须集中化。但在发生灾难的情况下，苏格兰必须承担一些财政义务。财政义务不能只落到英国其余地区肩上。

The need for clear lines of accountability and authority is fundamental. One country, one government, one central bank – that is the right principle. This, we have learnt, is particularly important in emergencies. Then the closest possible co-operation between the government, the central bank and the regulators is essential. In the next crisis, the government may even require the central bank to finance the government outright. It has to be clear that, in this situation, the bank would be answerable to one government – the UK government.

清晰的责任和权力划分绝对必要。一个国家，一个政府，一家央行——这才是正确的原则。从经验来看，这一点在危急情况下尤其重要。政府、央行和监管机构之间实现尽可能紧密的合作有着至关重要的意义。下一场危机中，政府甚至可能要求央行直接资助政府。必须明确一点：在这种情况下，央行将只对一个政府负责，那就是英国政府。

Some argue that insisting on these conditions is impossible. A letter to the Financial Times even stated that “The UK after a Scottish secession will not be the UK but a different state.” It will not. It will be the UK without Scotland. As happened when the Irish Republic left in the 1920s, the Westminster parliament, the bulk of the laws of that parliament and a government accountable to that parliament will all continue to exist. Scotland will merely have terminated its temporary participation. Evidently the Act of Union would be repealed. But this does not mean the existence of the Bank of England or the laws that govern it will be in doubt. Scotland may leave the UK. It cannot take core institutions with it.

有人辩称，坚持这些条件是不可能的。英国《金融时报》的一封读者来信甚至说，“没有了苏格兰的英国将不再是英国，而是另外一个国家”。不会是这样的。英国还会是英国，只是没有了苏格兰。正如上世纪20年代爱尔兰共和国脱离英国时的情形一样，英国国会、国会的大部分法律、以及对国会负责的政府，都将继续存在。只不过是苏格兰将不再属于英国——它属于英国的历史原本也不长。《联合法案》(Act of Union)显然会被废除。但这不意味着英国央行(BoE)、或约束其行为的各项法律的存续会产生疑问。苏格兰或许会脱离英国，但它无法把最重要的机构一同带走。

A currency union on the lines I have outlined would be perfectly satisfactory. But it would be one in which Scotland and the Scots would have still less weight than now. They would retain access to a lender of last resort within the sterling area, but at a heavy price.

我上面概述的货币联盟，将是一个非常令人满意的货币联盟。但在这样的联盟中，苏格兰和苏格兰人的话语权比现在还低。他们将保有求助英镑区最后贷款人的权力，但需为此付出高昂的代价。

If that is what the Scots really prefer, that would be fine by me. But if they want sovereign equality, they should reject the idea. Alternatives to the currency union exist. Some might work well. An independent Scotland should choose one of them.

如果这就是苏格兰人真正想要的，我没什么意见。但如果他们想要主权平等，他们就应当拒绝这个主意。货币联盟之外的选择并非不存在。其他一些选择没准相当可行。独立的苏格兰应该从这里面选一个。