普京"资源民族主义"面临考验

During his time in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin has drawn on two potent sources of political strength: high oil prices, which fell into his lap during the boom; and patriotic fervour, which he stoked by engineering regional conflicts. Now the oil price is falling like a stone. Will the Russian president be able to rely on patriotic mobilisation alone?

在主政克林姆林宫期间，弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)利用两大因素有效地扩大自己的政治影响力：一个是高油价，在繁荣时期，这一好处得来全不费工夫；另一个是爱国主义热情，他通过挑起地区冲突助长了这种热情。如今油价正直线下跌，这位俄罗斯总统能够单纯依赖于民众的爱国热情吗？

The past decade brought two periods of surging oil prices: one that ended in 2008 amid the flames of the financial crisis; and another that began barely three years later. But last week a barrel of oil fetched as little as $70, from $105 in June, and Russian producers must be feeling the squeeze.

过去10年油价经历了两轮飙升：一轮葬送在了2008年金融危机的大火之中；短短3年过后又开始了新一轮。但上周油价从6月的每桶105美元跌至70美元低位，俄罗斯生产商肯定感受到了压力。

The latest slowdown marks a moment of danger for Mr Putin. In the decade and a half since he first became president, the government has strengthened its control over oil and gas and increased its role in the financial sector. The creeping tide of nationalisation eroded incentives for investment, and swept away the resources needed for private investment. This is hardly without precedent; in resource-rich countries people are usually enthusiastic about nationalisation. But they expect benefits.

当前油价跌势使普京面临一个危险时刻。自他14年前首次担任俄罗斯总统以来，俄罗斯政府加大了对油气的控制，并增强了政府在金融业的作用。逐渐兴起的国有化浪潮削弱了投资激励，卷走了私人投资所需的资源。这并非没有先例：在资源丰富的国家，人们通常对国有化热情十足。但他们期待的是好处。

In the early years of Mr Putin’s presidency, they were not disappointed. The oil bounty pushed up consumption, stimulating growth. Most of the money was distributed through market channels. But the second oil price boom did not translate into economic performance as smoothly. In 2012 and 2013, when prices were often above $100, the economy was close to stagnation.

在普京总统任期的最初几年，他们没有感到失望。石油财富推升了消费，刺激了经济增长。其中多数资金通过市场渠道进行了分配。但第二轮油价飙涨却未能改善经济表现。2012年和2013年，当油价常常突破100美元时，俄罗斯经济却接近停滞。

A dearth of investment led to rising costs, consumption increases ran out of steam, and the oil riches instead had to be meted out through government largesse. By the beginning of this decade, public spending was more than a quarter higher than in the middle of the last one, much of it going on social assistance, higher pensions and public sector wages, as well as military spending.

投资不足导致成本上升，消费增长失去动力，石油财富只能通过政府支出进行分配。到本10年初，政府公共支出比上一个10年中期高出逾四分之一，其中很多流向社会救助、养老金提高、公共部门薪资以及军事开支。

This approach is sometimes called “resource nationalism”, and we have seen it before: in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, for example, or in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It inevitably involves confrontation with the west as the regime seals itself off.

这种方法有时被称作“资源民族主义”，我们以前曾看到过：例如在萨达姆•侯赛因(Saddam Hussein)统治下的伊拉克，或者乌戈•查韦斯(Hugo Chávez)领导下的委内瑞拉。随着该政权将自己封闭起来，不可避免的要与西方形成对峙。

Politicians who follow this path typically proclaim themselves regional leaders, and engineer conflicts with neighbouring countries that help patriotic mobilisation. Confrontations abroad are a source of legitimacy at home. They offer an excuse for repression, and they draw people into a nationalist narrative. The declared goals of the conflict are irrelevant; what matters is the perpetuation of conflict itself. Seen this way, hopeless fights seem rational, despite the cost.

走上这条道路的政治家一般自我标榜为地区领袖，他们会挑起与邻国的冲突，这些冲突有利于利用爱国主义热情。海外冲突是国内合法性的来源。它们为镇压提供了借口，并把人们带入民族主义叙事(nationalist narrative)。公开的冲突目标并不重要：重要的是冲突的延续。从这种角度来看，尽管要付出高昂代价，但毫无希望的战争似乎是合理的。

The transition from soft authoritarianism to totalitarian rule depends on three preconditions: popular support, the acquiescence of elites, and an economy that is not deteriorating too quickly. For now, popular support is Mr Putin’s strongest suit. After a period of decline, his approval rating is said to have jumped to 85 per cent in June.

从软性威权主义(soft authoritarianism)过渡到极权主义需要3个先决条件：民众支持、精英阶层的默许，同时经济没有出现过快恶化。目前，民众支持是普京最大的优势。在经过一段时期的下滑后，据说他的支持率在6月跃升至85%。

This may be misleading: in an authoritarian climate, such numbers are extremely dubious. Public discussion, such as it is, takes place in the shadows, and opinion polls offer only a distorted reflection. Although anti-western feelings are intensifying, Russians’ lifestyles are now more westernised than ever before. Two years ago, tens of thousands took to Moscow’s streets to demand modernisation.

这可能具有误导性：在威权体制下，这些数字极其可疑。公共讨论是在阴影之下进行的，民意调查也只是一种歪曲的反映。尽管反西方的情绪在加剧，但俄罗斯人的生活方式比以往任何时候都更加西化。两年前，数万人曾走上莫斯科街头要求实现现代化。

The elites have lost some of their nerve in the face of Mr Putin’s apparent popularity. But it is the economy – the double blow of sanctions and a falling oil price – that poses the most serious threat to the president. Repressive institutions are not completed yet, and the country is not sufficiently closed. The Kremlin is hesitating, wondering whether to escalate the confrontation, or ease off while the new economic reality sinks in.

面对普京表面上的受欢迎程度，精英们失去了一些勇气。但对普京构成最严重威胁的是俄罗斯的经济，该国经济受到西方制裁以及油价下跌的双重打击。高压机制尚未完成，该国还没有完全闭关锁国。克里姆林宫正在犹豫不决，在人们意识到新的经济现实之际，要将冲突升级还是要缓和冲突。

But the logic of resource nationalism knows no reversal. A regime that will not let go of its country’s natural riches cannot create prosperity. Instead, Mr Putin must channel the patriotic spirits of his people. And that means intensifying his conflict with the west.

但“资源民族主义”的逻辑是不可逆转的。一个不愿放弃掌控本国自然财富的政权是无法缔造繁荣的。而普京必须疏导俄罗斯人民的爱国主义精神。这意味着需要加剧他与西方的冲突。