关注社会:福岛核事故的教训

In retrospect I cannot but marvel at the extent of my naivety and ignorance then. But such was the mindset of almost everyone in my country in those fateful two weeks, after Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant was plunged into "station blackout" by the impact of the tsunami of March 11 last year.
回首过去，我无法不对自己当时表现出的幼稚和无知程度感到惊讶。但在受去年3?11海啸影响，东京电力公司(Tokyo Electric Power Company)下属福岛第一核电站陷入“全厂断电”状态之后的两周中——这两周对我们的命运产生了重大影响——在我的国家，几乎每一个人都是这种心态。
What I simply did not recognise was that Japan was on the edge of an existential crisis, as a cascading nuclear accident rapidly unfolded. For 48 hours from March 14, disaster seemed especially imminent. Officials in the prime minister's office were gloomy if not desperate. Late on March 14 Masataka Shimizu, then president of Tepco, began telephoning officials and insinuating the company's intentions to abandon the plant and evacuate workers — compelling the then prime minister, Naoto Kan, to intervene decisively: he stormed into Tepco headquarters and ordered senior managers not to abandon ship. He also implored that a "death squad" be formed to continue the battle and inject water into the reactor vessels.
我当时完全没有意识到，随着一场重大核事故一环接一环地迅速展开，日本正处于一场事关生死存亡的危机边缘。3月14日之后的48小时内，大难临头的感觉似乎尤其明显。首相办公室的官员们即便没有绝望，也已十分悲观了。3月14日晚间，时任东电公司总裁的清水正孝(Masataka Shimizu)开始致电政府官员，暗示该公司欲舍弃核电厂并疏散工人——这迫使时任日本首相的菅直人(Naoto Kan)采取果断干预：他气冲冲地来到东电总部，命令高管们不得弃厂。他还要求组建“敢死队”继续战斗，并向反应堆容器注水。
The stakes, we now know, were extraordinarily high. Unbeknown to the public, Mr Kan also instructed Dr Shunsuke Kondo, chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), to draw up a "worst case scenario". The resulting contingency document submitted on March 25 envisioned a hydrogen explosion in Unit 1 initiating a succession of meltdowns. The resulting plume of radiation could have led to the evacuation of Tokyo's metropolitan area, the report projected.
现在我们知道，当时的风险是何等之高。可我们并不知道，菅直人当时还指示日本原子能委员会(Atomic Energy Commission)委员长、近藤骏介(Shunsuke Kondo)博士设想出“可能出现的最糟糕情况”。这份3月25日提交的意外事故报告设想，1号机组将发生氢气爆炸，继而引发一连串的熔毁事故。该报告预计，由此产生的辐射将令东京的中心区域不得不进行疏散。
How could we have come to this? How could such a technologically advanced country be so unprepared? Reflecting on all this, after six months heading an independent commission on the accident, I have a better sense of what transpired — and the lessons Japan badly needs to learn from the disaster.
我们怎么会走到这一步？这样一个拥有先进技术的国家怎么会如此的措手不及？日本成立了一个独立委员会来调查这起事故。在担任该委员会负责人的6个月后，经过一番思前想后，对于究竟发生了什么，我有了更加清晰的认识，同时也更加清楚地意识到日本急需从此次灾难中汲取什么样的教训。
For one, our nuclear industry became ensnared in its twisted myth of "absolute safety", propagated by interest groups seeking to gain broad acceptance for nuclear power. To wit, when Niigata Prefecture made plans in 2010 to conduct an accident drill for earthquake preparedness, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) recommended revising the plans to avoid sparking "unnecessary misunderstanding and anxiety" in the public; the prefecture was duly obliged to drop the earthquake premise in favour of a less menacing alternative — heavy snow! Similarly, utility companies' aversion to actions smacking of preparations for a potential nuclear disaster meant that development of robots to assist in nuclear accidents was never pursued.
其中之一，由于一些利益团体为了获得人们对核能的广泛支持而对其大肆鼓吹，我们的核工业因此陷入了“绝对安全”的扭曲神话。举例来说，当新泻县2010年计划举行以预防地震为目的的事故演习时，日本原子力安全保安院(NISA)建议修改该计划，以避免在公众中引发“不必要的误解和紧张”；新泻县按照要求被迫改变了以地震为前提的假想情况，转而设想了另一种威胁程度较低的情况——暴雪！同样，公用事业公司不愿采取类似于预防潜在核灾难的行动，这表明，研制参与处理核事故的机器人从来都是一番空话。
At its core, Japan's nuclear safety regulatory regime was phoney. Regulators pretended to regulate; utilities pretended to be regulated. In reality, the latter were far more powerful in expertise and clout.
从本质上说，日本的核安全监管体系已经名存实亡。监管者假装在监管；核能企业假装受到了监管。在现实中，后者拥有的专业水准和影响力要大得多。

Beyond this hollow structure, an excessively risk-averse approach and a stovepipe structure within the administration did not serve the country well. Submitted to this critical test, inherent governance problems came to light, exposing two fundamental lessons. First, we need to overcome the myth of "absolute safety" and shatter the taboo that surrounds the very concept of risks in the nuclear energy business. We must also learn how to prepare for the unthinkable and unanticipated. This requires constant vigilance regarding the safety and security of nuclear plants as well as practices of nuclear waste disposal. Second, we need to build a regulatory body independent from the "nuclear village" of industry, bureaucrats, and academics working to promote nuclear energy. This demands a foundation of solid expertise and professionalism. And then, one more lesson — if we can call it a lesson — is that we really should look back upon the crisis with an appropriate sense of vulnerability and humility, recognising the uncontrollably destructive power of the nuclear monster once unleashed. This latter should never be forgotten.
除了这种空洞的结构之外，极其不愿正视风险的态度以及政府内部的“烟囱式”结构也给日本带来了不良影响。在这场至关重要的考验中，固有的管理问题暴露出来，给我们带来了两大深刻的教训。首先，我们要抛弃“绝对安全”的神话，破除存在于核能领域的有关风险观念的禁忌。我们还必须学会如何为无法想象和无法预测之事做好准备。这要求对核电站的安全以及核废料的处理工作保持时刻警惕。其次，我们要组建一家监管机构，该机构应独立于由行业人士、政府官员以及致力于推广核能的学者所构成的“核群体”。这需要有扎实的知识和专业性作为基础。此外，还有一个教训在于——如果我们可以将其称之为教训的话——我们确实应该以一种适当的脆弱感和谦卑感来反思这场危机。我们要意识到，一旦被释放出来，“核怪兽”将产生无法控制的破坏力。后一条教训应该永远被铭记。
Japanese society has learnt keenly the crucial role of leadership in a time of national crisis. It is precisely this issue that continues to divide and even polarise my country most profoundly. One year on people are still grasping for an answer as to what kind of leadership Japan really needs. In the course of our investigations, a staff member in Mr Kan's office made a striking statement — one he would never utter publicly out of respect to the evacuees: "How Lucky we were that God is still with us in this country."
日本社会真切地感受到，在发生全国性危机的时候，领导人起到的作用是何等重要。正是这一问题让我的国家继续分化，甚至是最深刻的极化。一年过后，人们仍在寻找一个答案：日本到底需要什么样的领导人？在我们的调查过程中，菅直人办公室的一名工作人员说出了这样一番惊人的话——出于对被疏散人员的尊重，他绝不会公开发表这种言论：“我们是何等幸运，在日本，上帝仍然与我们同在。”
The truth is that the imagined "worst-case scenario" was closer than anyone would wish to admit: but for the direction of the wind — towards the Pacific, not inland, in the four days after the earthquake; but for the manner in which the gate separating the reactor-well and the spent-fuel pool in Unit 4 broke — presumably facilitating the transfusion of water into the pool. Luck was undeniably on our side.
尽管所有人都不愿承认，但事实是，设想中“可能出现的最糟情况”离我们近在咫尺：要不是因为地震过后那四天中的风向——吹向太平洋，而不是吹向内陆；要不是因为4号机组内，反应堆井与废燃料池之间的大门以那种方式破裂——这也许让水流更便于注入池内。无可否认，我们的运气不错。
Is that it — providence? What of individuals? Some would say we had Mr Kan as the nation's "chief risk officer" at the critical moment, even if many would take offence at that. Masao Yoshida, manager of the plant at the time of the disaster, has also been praised for his courage and his leadership. His legendary kabuki play — making a show of agreeing to the order from Tepco's head office to halt water injections until further notification from the government, while simultaneously instructing his employees to proceed — has entered popular folklore.
这是天意吗？还是个人的作用？有些人会说，菅直人在这个生死攸关的时刻肩负起了“首席危机处理官”的重任，但也有很多人并不认同这一说法。灾难发生时担任福岛第一核电站站长的吉田雅夫(Masao Yoshida)，他的勇气和领导力也得到了人们的赞扬。他上演的那出带有传奇色彩的“好戏”——他假装接受东电公司总部要求停止注水以等待政府进一步通知的命令，与此同时却指示员工继续注水——已成为人们津津乐道的话题。
Against the backdrop of ineptitude and risk-aversion at Tepco headquarters, admiration for him is understandable. Yet there is something troubling in a manager on the ground disobeying instructions from above so brazenly. It is even more troubling to see his rebellion widely praised in the court of public opinion. In truth, this a story without heroes — only a long sigh of relief and an invoice of vital morals to be parsed.
鉴于东电总部的无能和不敢正视风险的态度，吉田雅夫受到敬仰是可以理解的。然而，对一个在现场如此肆无忌惮地违反上级指示的站长来说，就有些麻烦了。更麻烦的是，他的不服从获得了舆论的广泛赞扬。事实上，这起事件中没有英雄——有的只是如释重负的感觉和需要深刻剖析的重大教训。
The writer heads the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, which set up the independent investigation commission on the accident
本文作者是日本再建基金会(Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation)的负责人，该基金会组建了核事故独立调查委员会。
译者:薛磊