靠自由和平等战胜恐怖主义

How are we to understand last week’s events in Paris? Why are people prepared to kill and die for their beliefs? How should liberAl democracies respond? Many people must be asking themselves these questions. A remarkable man, Eric Hoffer, addressed them in a book published in 1951: The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements . The ideas in his book, developed in response to Nazism and communism, echo powerfully today.

我们该如何理解上周发生在巴黎的恐怖事件？人们为何会准备为了自己的信仰杀人或赴死？自由民主该如何回应？一定有很多人都在问自己。一位杰出的作家——埃里克•霍弗(Eric Hoffer)曾在其1951年出版的《狂热分子：群众运动圣经》(The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements)一书中阐述了这些问题。书中的观点针对的是纳粹主义和共产主义，但对如今的问题也可作有力的回应。

Hoffer was born at the turn of the 20th century and died in 1983. He worked in restaurants, as a migrant farmhand, as a gold-prospector and, for 25 years, as a longshoreman in San Francisco. Self-taught, he could penetrate to the core of a topic in brilliant and limpid sentences. The True Believer is among my favourite books. It is once again an invaluable guide.

霍弗出生在20世纪之初，逝于1983年。他曾在餐厅工作，当过农场工人、金矿勘探工，并在旧金山当了25年的码头工人。他自学成才，能用才华横溢而又简单明了的句子，深入浅出地参透问题的核心。《狂热分子》是我最喜欢的书籍之一。如今它再次成为宝贵的指导。

Who, then, is a true believer? Said and Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, the men responsible for last week’s terrorist attacks in Paris, were true believers. So are those active in al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) or Boko Haram. So, once, were Nazis and committed communists. True believers, argues Hoffer, are not characterised by the content of their faith, but by the nature of its claims. Their beliefs claim absolute certainty and demand absolute loyalty. True believers are those who accept those claims and welcome those demands. They are prepared to kill and to die for their cause, because its success in the world is more important to them than their lives or indeed anybody’s life. The true believer is therefore a fanatic.

那么，谁才是狂热分子？上周在巴黎进行恐怖袭击的萨伊德•库阿奇(Said Kouachi)、切里夫•库阿奇(Cherif Kouachi)和阿米迪•库利巴利(Amedy Coulibaly)是狂热分子。基地组织、塔利班、“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”(Isis)或博科圣地(Boko Haram)的激进分子也是。过去的纳粹分子和狂热的共产主义者也是。霍弗认为，狂热分子并非以他们的信仰内容定性，而是以其信仰所宣称内容的本质来判断。他们的信仰宣称绝对的确定，要求绝对的忠诚。狂热分子是那些欣然接受这些宣称和要求的人。他们随时准备为了事业杀人或赴死，因为对他们来说，事业在全世界取得成功比他们甚至任何人的生命更重要。因此他们是狂热的。

The fanatic is a familiar character in history. Fanaticism is born of temperament, not ideas. The fanatical temperament can express itself in many different ways. Hoffer’s was an age of secular religions. Reality killed the religions that promised salvation on earth. But it cannot kill religions that promise eternity. The latter are now, once again, the most powerful forms of belief, though nationalism may yet run them close.

狂热分子在历史上屡见不鲜。狂热主义是情绪而非思想的产物。狂热情绪的表现方式有很多种。霍弗所处的是一个世俗宗教的时代。现实杀死了那些许诺拯救世人的宗教。但它杀不死那些承诺永生的宗教。如今，后者再一次成为最强势的信仰形式，尽管民族主义可能终将赶上来。

Indeed, religion and nationalism have frequently reinforced one another: God, after all, is so often held to be on “our side”. Thus, Hoffer states that “in modern times nationalism is the most copious and durable source of mass enthusiasm and that nationalist fervour must be tapped if the drastic changes projected and initiated by revolutionary enthusiasm are to be consummated”.

实际上，宗教和民族主义经常彼此强化：毕竟，上帝经常被认为在“我们这边”。因此，霍弗指出，“在现代，民族主义是群众热情最丰富、最持久的源泉，而且由革命热情谋划和发起的社会剧变要想取得成功，必须利用民族主义狂热”。

One of Hoffer’s important insights is that it is not poverty that turns someone into a true believer; it is frustration. It is a sense that one deserves far better. It is not surprising that some of those engaged in terrorism are petty criminals. Hoffer argues “that the frustrated predominate among the early adherents of all mass movements and that they usually join of their own accord”.

霍弗的一个重要深刻见解是，使一个人成为狂热分子的不是贫穷，而是挫败感，是一种认为自己值得更好生活的感觉。一些加入恐怖主义的人是轻罪犯，这不足为奇。霍弗认为，“所有群众运动的早期追随者中，挫败者都占主导地位，而且他们通常是自愿加入的。”

Among their characteristics is that they may feel they do not fit into their societies. This is not unlikely to be the case for some children of immigrant minorities. Their attachment to the culture of their family’s origin and identification with the culture of their family’s destination are both quite likely to be fragile.

他们的特征之一是，可能感觉无法融入自己的社会。这种想法可能出现在一些少数族裔移民的孩子身上。他们对家庭原籍地文化的归属感，以及对所在国文化的认同感，可能都相当脆弱。

What then does the belief offer? In essence, it offers an answer: it tells the adherents what to think, how to feel and what to do. It provides an all-embracing community in which to live. It offers a reason for living, killing and dying. It replaces emptiness with fullness, and aimlessness with purpose. It offers a cause. This is sometimes noble and sometimes base, but it is a cause, and that is what matters.

那信仰又能提供些什么？从本质上说，它给人们提供了一个答案：它告诉信徒去思考什么、怎样感受以及该做什么。它提供了一个包容所有的集体，供信徒生活。它提供了一个活着、杀戮和死亡的理由。它用充实代替空虚，用目的代替盲目。它提供了一项事业，有时高尚、有时卑劣，但终归是事业，这才是最重要的。

“All mass movements generate in their adherents a . . . proclivity for united action,” notes Hoffer. “All of them, irrespective of the doctrine they preach . . . , breed fanaticism, enthusiasm, fervent hope, hatred and intolerance.” All demand “blind faith and single-hearted allegiance”.

“所有的群众运动都会在其追随者中产生一种对集体行动的嗜好，”霍弗指出，“无论它们宣扬的教义是什么，所有群众运动都会催生疯狂、热情、强烈的希望、憎恨和偏执。”所有的群众运动都要求“盲目的信仰和一心一意的忠诚。”

Communism has waned. So, in many places, has secularism. Religion has taken its place. The moral and intellectual bankruptcy of secular rulers — particularly corrupt secular despots — has encouraged this revival. But western secular democracies are also vulnerable to assaults from true believers in militant Islamism. wars may control them. But violence will not eliminate them, as the west has learnt in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy is not “terrorism”, it is the idea of which terrorism is the fruit. Deterring people willing to die is hard. Killing ideas is hard. Killing religious ideas is nigh on impossible. If such ideas are to wane, they will do so only at the hands of more attractive ideas. Possibly, the more extreme might perish of exhaustion. But this could take a long time. Remember that Luther’s ideas triggered 130 years of religious wars in Europe. It is a disturbing precedent.

共产主义已式微。在很多地方，世俗主义也一样。宗教取代了世俗主义的位置。世俗统治者——特别是腐朽的世俗暴君——在道义和智慧上的垮台，刺激了宗教的复活。但是，西方世俗民主国家也容易受到激进伊斯兰主义狂热分子的攻击。战争或许可以控制他们。但是，正如西方国家从伊拉克和阿富汗战争中吸取的教训，暴力不会彻底消灭他们。“恐怖主义”不是敌人，孕育恐怖主义的思想才是。打消人们赴死的意愿是困难的。消灭观念是困难的。消灭宗教观念则几乎是不可能的。想让这些观念逐渐消失，只能借助于更具吸引力的观念。更极端的观念可能只能等待其势竭而亡。但这可能需要很长时间。别忘了马丁•路德(Martin Luther)的思想曾引发了欧洲长达130年的宗教战争。这是个令人不安的先例。

What is to be done? I claim no expertise in this area. But I claim at least an interest: that of a citizen of a liberal democracy, which I very much wish to remain so. My answers are as follows.

我们应该做些什么？我不认为自己在这个领域具备专业知识。但是至少我认为这与我息息相关：我是一个自由民主国家的公民，而且我非常希望一直这样。我的答案如下所述：

First, accept that we are playing the long game of containment.

第一，我们玩的是一个长期的围堵游戏，接受这个现实。

Second, recognise that the heart of the struggle is elsewhere. The west can help. But it cannot win those wars.

第二，斗争的核心在别处，认清这一点。西方国家可以提供帮助。但是它们赢不了这些战争。

Third, offer the lived idea of equality as citizens as an alternative to violent jihad.

第三，宣传公民平等这一有生命力的理念，来取代暴力圣战的想法。

Fourth, appreciate and respond to the frustrations many now feel.

第四，理解很多人现在体会到的挫败感，并作出回应。

Fifth, accept the need for measures to provide security. But remember that absolute safety is never achievable.

第五，承认必须采取措施提供安全。但是要记住，绝对安全是永远不可能实现的。

Finally, remain true to our beliefs, since without them we have nothing to offer in this struggle. We must not abandon either the rule of law or the ban on torture. Once we do, we have already lost this war of ideals and ideas.

最后一点，忠于我们的信仰，因为除了这些信仰，我们在这场斗争中没有别的武器。我们绝对不能废除法治或者对酷刑的禁令。如果我们这样做，我们便已经输掉了这场关于理想与思想的战争。

True believers do, once again, want to do us harm. But the threat they pose is not comparable to the ones that liberal democracy survived in the 20th century. We should recognise the dangers, but not overreact. In the end, this too will pass.

狂热分子会想要再一次伤害我们。但是他们所构成的威胁，与自由民主在20世纪战胜的那些威胁相比不可同日而语。我们应该认识到危险，但不应该过于恐惧。最终，这些也将成为过去。